This special issue of Perspectives on Federalism collects papers mostly presented at the General Conference of the European Consortium of Political Research in September 2014.
1.
This special issue of Perspectives on Federalism tackles the question whether and in what respect sub-national constitutional politics and sub-national constitutionalism are linked to self-rule, regional democracy, and multilayered systems. We understand sub-national constitutions in a broad sense. They include constitutional law as well as sub-national legal texts that work and have similar effects as proper constitutions. In addition, we consider the constitutional "space" national constitutions grant to sub-national autonomy as well as bottom-up claims for regional autonomy in centralized states. Evidently, sub-national politics dealing with constitutions and constitutional politics in this broad sense pertains to the aforementioned questions. Yet, it is not always clear in what way and with what effect sub-national constitutions do provide answers, nor what the "right" degree of subsidiarity or sub-national autonomy is from a democratic point of view. Ironically, one might say that sense sub-national constitutionalism and sub-national constitutional politics play a similar role as the number "42" in Douglas Adams' third book of his science fiction novel "The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy". In this novel Adams has the computer Deep Thought come up with the "Answer to the Ultimate Question of Life, the Universe, and Everything". As a matter of fact, it took Deep Thought seven and a half million years to compute the answer, which turned out to be: "42" (Adams 2005) . I The problem was that those who designed and switched on Deep Thought failed to ask the proper question.
However, if we do not know "The Ultimate Question of Life, the Universe, and
Everything", the respective "Answer" is of no use at all -which is a pity, indeed. Subnational constitutionalism seems to share the fate of "42" in Adams' novel. For many it is an answer, but we do not know to which question. But we can guess. Overall, we see three discourses in which sub-national constitutional politics plays a crucial role.
Firstly, sub-national constitutions challenge the view that undivided sovereignty is a necessary precondition of an integrated nation-state. On the contrary, in the Federalist Papers Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay (1778/1994) already rejected the notion that sovereignty has to rest in just one institution. Or: Multilevel systems in general and federalism in particular necessarily break up sovereignty. In this perspective, subnational regions enjoy sovereign prerogatives and can claim to share in statehood. In E -III federal states "shared rule" and "self-rule" go together (Elazar 1987; Popelier 2014 ). The demand for regional self-rule can even lead to secession from a nation-state. Such developments seem to be triggered by processes of globalization and European integration.
Indeed, in the EU context every state -federal or not -is part of a multi-level constitutional system. "Methodological nationalism" fails to capture recent changes in member states of the European Union. Unitary states have been transformed into federal states (or they are about to do so), federal states have devolved competences to subnational levels. In other, non-federal EU member states actors at the sub-national level strive for more rights. In some of these cases, sub-national actors got the chance to set up constitutions, establish non-formal statutes, or make over their already existing subnational constitution. Sub-national constitutions become then a means to sustain some sort of autonomy in a multilevel system. In other cases, no formal or explicit constitutional dimension can (yet) be identified, but claims with constitutional relevance are expressed by regional actors (often grounded in distinct minority identities, as in the case of the Hungarian minority in Romania). In yet other cases, tendencies to sub-national constitutionalization are contrasted by or in tension with simultaneous drives to a recentralization of the state (as is currently the case in the constitutional reform in Italy). In E -IV superior to other legal acts, they are to set up the polity and the rules for the political process, and they are to be manifestations of the will of the people, hence they have to be democratically legitimized. The claim, then, modern constitutions make is broader. Modern constitutions do not only set up some institutions and organs that help to govern. As a consequence, we can argue that constitutional law and constitutionalism are not the same thing. While the first one refers to formal aspects, the second one tries to accommodate ideas about forms and objectives of the polity. Thus, constitutional law is the most fundamental law of a society. It has to be adopted in a specific way and amended in a more difficult procedure than normal law. Historically, subsidiarity has never been a democratic idea. It is rather a normative rule for allocating competencies between levels. In principle it gives preference to the lower level if -and only if -higher levels are not better in providing the service. In other words subsidiarity just constitutes the need for justification to transfer competencies to higher levels if these are better in dealing with the issue at hand. According to Werner Vandenbruwaene "the commonly shared denominator of the principle of subisidiarity indicates the search for an optimal allocation and exercise of governmental authority in terms of efficiency and legitimacy." (Vandenbruwaene 2014: 49).
2.
As mentioned above, the special issue collects papers mostly presented at the General E -VII this puzzle. Lorenz brings to the fore that sub-national constitutional politics in the Länder do not just follow up on developments at the national or European level. On the contrary, Lorenz argues that sub-national constitutional politics can only be explained if we take subnational factors into account. Perceptions, negotiations and procedural rules are subnationally shaped. As a consequence, we have to take these features into account in order to explain sub-national constitutional politics in Germany. And it is only due to these features that sub-national constitutions can help integrating the people into the overall political order. Sub-national constitutional politics does, hence, not challenge the applicability of the federal constitution but rather helps to stabilize the system as a whole by enabling the political actors to find individual constitutional solutions below the level of federal regulation and thus filling integration gaps at the federal level.
Kriszta Kovács, Zsolt Körtvélyesi, and Alíz Nagy tackle the question of how universal human rights that guarantee non-discrimination fit with claims of national sovereignty. As a rule people are born into their political communities. There is no need to apply for citizenship. At the same time nation states are entitled to define the rules of both birthright and acquired political membership. Yet, the authors argue that human rights principles, first and foremost non-discrimination guarantees, should be given preference over national rules. While the arguments presented by Kriszta Kovács, Zsolt Körtvélyesi, and Alíz Nagy are general by nature, they pay special attention to events that pertain to the case of Hungary. The paper explores in this the complex relation between a nationalist constitutional project (Hungary), external minorities (in e.g. Slovakia and Romania), external ethnic citizenship, and the rights and claims to sub-national self-government of Hungarian minorities in bordering countries.
Zubair Shahid addresses similar issues as the preceding papers but in a very different context. Shahid's paper examines the case of Pakistan and how federalism and sub-national self-rule evolved in this developing country and in fragile political circumstances. His paper challenges the widely held view that the tendency to regionalization and multilevel governance is a purely European matter. On the contrary, countries in different world regions and with different political and cultural traditions equally have to deal with these issues.
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